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This paper sets out findings from WaterAid’s research in East Asian states on the 
political economy of sanitation and hygiene services that delivered total coverage 
within a generation. The purpose of this research is not to claim blueprints for 
success – the specifics of each case show the contextual nature of sanitation 
transformation. However, the intention is to galvanise and frame the emerging 
dialogue in the sanitation and hygiene sectors, on how to achieve the necessary 
radical ‘step-change’ in progress, to deliver universal access to services by 2030. 
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Introduction 
 
There is a strong chance that the UN’s post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals 
framework will include the target of universal access to water, sanitation and hygiene 
(WASH) by 2030, as part of a broader poverty eradication agenda. Sanitation1 for all 
will be particularly challenging to achieve. Globally, sanitation is counted as the most 
off-track of all the current Millennium Development Goals sectors. For most countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, progress has been particularly slow in 
delivering, extending and sustaining services. 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated from WHO/Unicef Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation 
www.wssinfo.org  
 
  
                                            
1 ‘Sanitation’ here is taken to be the safe separation, disposal and treatment of human excreta. 
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To hit the target of universal access by 2030, improving the performance of the 
sanitation sector2 is essential. This will require new strategic approaches, to decisively 
shift the effectiveness of the reform agenda, but there is a lack of comprehensive 
strategies available to use as a guide. 
 
This paper introduces the findings from research in four East Asian countries – 
Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand3, and aims to begin to fill that gap. 
These countries were selected because they produced rapid and remarkable results in 
delivering total sanitation coverage in their formative stages as nation-states. While 
their initial conditions were very different to those currently found in ‘fragile’ and ‘least 
developed’ countries in Africa and South Asia, some useful conclusions can inform the 
development of strategic approaches to delivering sanitation for all: 
 
• High-level political leadership was critical and did not stem from community-
driven demand. 
• Hygiene, cleanliness and public health aims drove sanitation improvements. 
• A well-coordinated multi-sector approach was a necessary condition for rapid 
sanitation improvements. 
• Capacity building happened alongside sanitation improvements. 
• The vision of total sanitation coverage came before attaining levels of national 
wealth, and reaching a threshold of per capita GDP was not decisive in the 
strategic choice to deliver total sanitation coverage. 
• Some element of subsidy was included, but alongside demand creation, and 
was often indirect (e.g. through housing subsidy). 
• Monitoring was continuous, with ‘feedback loops’ to revise methods, raise 
standards and build new reforms as goals were achieved. 
 
High-level political leadership was critical and did not stem from community-led 
demand 
 
In each of the countries studied, improvements in sanitation and hygiene were a result 
of a high-level political push, from the head of government down, to elevate national 
standards of public health, cleanliness and hygiene practices. This may have been 
triggered by intra-regional competition, the development of a social contract for newly 
independent states, the drive for a strengthened and diversified economic base, or the 
construction of a national identity based on the pursuit of ‘common goods’. But in 
each case, the goal of total sanitation coverage was pursued as part of a wider 
narrative around notions of common wellbeing, modernity and nation-building. 
                                            
2 ‘Sector’ here is taken to be the activities and agencies (including government ministries, public sector 
agencies, private sector and civil society groups) necessary for planning, implementing and monitoring 
ongoing delivery of services. 
3 Malaysia case study and full synthesis report pending. 
 Research paper  
 
  
www.wateraid.org wateraid@wateraid.org 
47-49 Durham Street, London SE11 5JD 020 7793 4500 
 Charity numbers 288701 (England and Wales) and SC039479 (Scotland) 
 
4 
 
As well as providing a strong political push, national leaders also took responsibility 
for continuing oversight and input into the implementation strategies necessary for 
delivering permanent sanitation services. The personal supervision by the head of 
government was high profile and personal. Theirs was not a one-off paper declaration, 
but rather a continuing process of promotion, progress-chasing, law-making and, at 
times, authoritarian punitive measures, driving changes in social and cultural norms.  
 
The Singapore post-independence nation-building project of the 1960s centred on a 
strategic choice to build an entreport4-oriented economy integrated into a global 
trading system. The high profile and long-term Keep Singapore Clean campaign was 
founded on notions of modernity that were required to attract inward investment.  
 
South Korea’s 1960s nation-building effort was articulated in terms of a social contract 
offering to build a society on the principle of ‘living well’. President Park Cheung Hee’s 
action on sanitation and hygiene included the regular issuance of presidential decrees 
requiring the accelerated implementation of legislation and institutional reforms. 
Malaysia’s post-independence development project was spurred by the belief that 
providing for the common good was a way to diffuse the threat posed by communist 
insurgency.  Equitable progress for the rural poor was a guiding principle, emphasised 
with the ‘New Spirit’ programme of rural development.  
 
In all cases, campaigns were also a means to pursue public common goods to build 
social cohesion. The ideological underpinnings for the behaviour change on hygiene 
were a mix of ideas of civic responsibility and the construction of social norms 
associated with notions of modernity.  
 
Leaders referred to specific local observations and used them to both point to areas of 
progress and chastise the lack of progress. None were reserved in their criticisms 
about shortcomings. 
 
“I mean to plan, to analyze, to conceive, as good as any in the world. But finally you 
go down, somebody’s got to put a screw, tighten the bolt, and has to see that he does 
it, the drive that he puts into it, that determines the pace.”  
 
PAP leader and later Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, talking to civil servants and technicians 
at the Political Centre, 14 June 1962 
 
They also focused on repeating the value-orientations that they believed to underpin 
sanitation and hygiene policy, linking them to the grander narrative around nation-
building and socio-economic development.  
 
                                            
4 A trading post where merchandise can be imported and exported without paying import duties, often at 
a profit. 
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“…unless something is done to help them [the rural poor], they would not keep pace 
with the nation’s progress. A new nation cannot afford to have an unbalanced 
population.”  
 
Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, 1958 
 
A focus on sanitation was established at the highest level of the Thai government 
(through the King of Thailand) and was reflected at all levels of government, from the 
central government to the village or district officials, with the presence of informed and 
competent officers. 
 
The Thai case study stands out as a model of effective use of public funds to promote 
and support improvements in sanitation on a large scale. Total coverage was achieved 
in Thailand by the late 1990s after 40 years of sustained public intervention, with a 
sharp reduction in mortality linked to diarrhoea. This success was the result of a 
comprehensive programme that provided sustained long-term funding with careful 
sequencing of demand and supply-side interventions and effective targeting of public 
subsidies to leverage private funding. 
 
While in all cases sanitation progress is punctuated by moments of crisis that spurred 
on action, such as slum fires, disease outbreaks and civil unrest, the overall strategy 
was primarily motivated by the positive goal of nation building. 
 
Hygiene, cleanliness and public health aims drove sanitation improvements 
 
In each of the countries studied, improvements in sanitation came as part of wider 
public health, housing and hygiene programmes, rather than being pursued as a 
standalone goal. As such, government-led and publicly-subsidised sanitation 
infrastructure was developed in parallel to changes to public health and hygiene 
policies. 
 
In South Korea, the government launched a Parasite Eradication Programme. The 
provision of sanitation infrastructure in low-income housing projects was an integral 
part of this. In Singapore, the 1967 Keep Singapore Clean campaign launch was 
quickly followed by the introduction of the Public Health Law. This was the first in a 
number of legal measures designed to regulate and change public health behaviours. 
That behaviour change drive was backed by punitive sanctions. 
 
For rural Malaysia, the approach of using the law to drive change was considered to be 
a policy instrument with limited reach in the rural context. But the rural development 
programme was built entirely around improving public health, with sanitation 
improvements at the core.  
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Similarly, Thailand focused on creating demand, with subsidies first provided through 
revolving funds (applied in different ways, depending on local circumstances) and then 
through the provision of a ‘Sanitation Activity Package’, which consisted of mostly 
hardware funding for seven activities, including water supply storage, excreta 
disposal, solid waste management, wastewater treatment, food sanitation, vector 
control and household sanitation. Villages had flexibility for allocating funds to the 
interventions or recipients most in need. Such policies succeeded in leveraging 
substantial household investments in sanitation; the study estimated that each baht 
of public funds leveraged 17 times more in private funds from households. 
 
A well-coordinated multi-sector approach, was a necessary condition for rapid 
sanitation improvements 
 
Delivering new sanitation infrastructure – within development programmes such as 
pro-poor housing, urban renewal, and primary education and public health initiatives, 
as well as in broader rural development schemes – required synchronised public 
policy and institutional coordination. 
 
In Singapore, the widespread extension of access to household sanitation happened 
through a large government-subsidised low-income housing programme. The rapid and 
widespread availability of affordable public housing saw a huge number of people 
move from informal kampong, or unfit slum housing, where open defecation was 
common, to flats with access to private safe sanitation. 
 
Malaysia built improved rural villages for the poor to resettle in. As well as being 
enclosed, for security, they were designed to be desirable, with better agricultural 
land, schools and clinics, as well as higher quality housing with water and sanitation 
services. There were additional efforts to improve villages that were not resettled, 
including subsidy for sanitation hardware.   
 
In South Korea, President Park built Five Year Development Plans that framed 
provisions such as sanitation as part of a national-level drive to improve the lives of 
citizens. It was followed through by presidential activism that included frequent visits 
to project sites to monitor progress, such as the New Village Movement that 
incorporated building sanitation infrastructure in rural areas. A schools-based Parasite 
Eradication Programme effectively integrated public health monitoring and behaviour 
change into national education curricula with the aim of eradicating endo-parasitic 
infection as the clear measurable indicator. 
 
In all countries, sanitation policies were anchored within a single ministry, but the 
implementation chains ran through multiple agencies and ministries, in all cases 
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including education, housing and health departments. To coordinate this there was 
ministerial oversight on roles and responsibilities.  
 
In Korea, detailed guidance on the specific roles of public institutions and staff was 
outlined in successive Presidential Decrees. In Singapore, sanitation was covered 
under the Ministry of the Environment, with divisions structured around functional 
roles capable of delivering both the necessary hardware and behaviour change 
components. Officials promoting behaviour change were housed within the 
Environmental Public Health Division, while the Environmental Engineering Division 
held responsibility for hardware and infrastructure programmes. Malaysia divided rural 
and urban sanitation, with rural sanitation situated within the Ministry of Health. This 
was a deliberate decision to ensure that sanitary engineers were available for rural 
sanitation, without the risk that they would be pulled away for urban projects. 
However, the Deputy Prime Minister emphasised coordination above all, introducing 
the ‘Red Book’ – a coordination implementation guidebook developed to remove any 
lag in the implementation of rural development projects caused by uncoordinated 
bureaucracy. 
 
“Your function, first and foremost, is a function of a ‘breaker of bottlenecks’. You must 
get out and around to every district looking for frustrations, looking for departmental 
disagreements, looking for delays, and when you have found them, you must 
diagnose them and then: (a) try on your own behalf to solve them; (b) if you cannot 
solve them yourself then report to the officers of my Ministry and ask them to solve 
them; and (c) when all else has failed then they will be brought to me and I will try and 
solve them.”  
 
Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia at the State Development Officers Conference, 13 December 1965 
 
Overall, the changes in Malaysia’s institutional structure reflect a fundamental shift in 
its intended function. Before independence, the health sector was primarily concerned 
with curative health in urban areas; after independence, preventive health care in rural 
areas became the priority, and, with this, rural sanitation.  
 
The figure on p8 demonstrates how in Singapore the two functions of behaviour 
change and infrastructure were housed within a single ministry. Importantly, the 
objective of behaviour change, highlighted in yellow was given equal prominence and 
situated in parallel structures to hardware delivery objectives, highlighted in blue. It 
also shows ‘capacity building’ (Training, Education and Communications Branch) 
being emphasised as a standalone priority. 
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Figure 1: Original organisational structure of Singapore’s Ministry of Environment 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Environment (1972) Annual report. Singapore: Ministry of Environment 
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Capacity building happened alongside sanitation improvements 
 
Setting up structures fit for delivering institutional mandates had the benefit of 
allowing administrative form to follow implementation function, but a wider internal 
capacity building challenge needed to be addressed. Budget allocations and 
mandates were, by themselves, insufficient. 
 
Each country government offered incentives for improved performance bolstered with 
continuing high-level motivation to build cohesive societies. But there were also 
strategies for a wider process of rapid and continuous internal capacity building. Staff 
were both sent abroad for training and enrolled in training and certification 
programmes in-country.  
 
Crucially, the design, implementation and monitoring of sanitation improvements did 
not wait for capacity development. The growth of the sector’s capability happened 
alongside efforts to make progress in sanitation coverage, as part of an agenda to 
strengthen the sector. Sometimes importing technical assistance from external 
support agencies, the governments built their institutional and technical capacity as 
part of the initial stages of implementing their national strategies.  
 
 
The vision and strategy for total sanitation coverage came before attaining levels of 
national wealth 
 
Attaining a threshold of national per capita income appears not to have been a key 
determinant in the choice to develop a national sanitation sector capable of expanding 
permanent services for all citizens. In the 1960s, the per capita income levels in the 
East Asian states studied were, at the outset of their national sanitation sector 
planning stages, equivalent to many Sub-Saharan African countries. This is significant 
because it suggests that the overall strategy and vision came first, and the sector 
investments from a variety of sources were sought after. 
 
The composition of finance in providing sanitation infrastructure for poorer 
communities was made up largely from official sources of finance, principally from 
government revenues but also from bilateral and multilateral grants and loans, and 
user fees or public housing rents. It is not the focus of this study, but it would be worth 
analysing whether today’s proliferation of vertical funds and the increasing preference 
of many bilateral donors for channelling Official Development Assistance through 
results-based and performance-based allocations would make the financing strategies 
of East Asian developmental states of the 1960s possible today. 
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Table 1: Different national improved sanitation coverage trajectories 
 
Country GDP per capita in 1960 
(in USD) 
National improved sanitation 
coverage rate in 2000 
South Korea $155 100% 
Ghana $183 10% 
Liberia $170 12% 
Senegal $249 43% 
Zambia $227 41% 
Zimbabwe $280 40% 
 
Source: World Bank and UNICEF/WHO 
 
 
Monitoring was continuous and standards raised as goals were achieved 
 
The complexities of coordinating multiple departments and policies required a 
continuous and cyclical process of monitoring and analysis. This allowed national 
governments to identify performance and implementation weaknesses and to respond 
to bottlenecks with remedial improvements and reforms. In the countries studied, the 
defining feature of even some of the most centrally driven national sanitation policies 
was a process of continuous local-level monitoring of programmes, from design, 
through the delivery chain, to implementation at project level, with ongoing follow up 
reforms and improvements. 
 
The Five Year Development Plans of South Korea were not static grand master plans. 
There were continuous revisions and improvements, with sometimes annual changes 
made through Presidential and Ministerial Decrees, each setting new enabling 
conditions or adjustments. 
 
For rural Malaysia, the Deputy Prime Minister established local ‘operations rooms’ 
where all development projects were monitored in real time so that obstacles could be 
identified and overcome. These were the locus of cross-sector coordination.  
 
“[Development teams] must also, at least once a week, have what I call ‘morning 
prayers’ where all departmental officers get together and instead of writing tedious 
minutes on files to each other, they settle their departmental differences together, in 
a coordinated way, in front of the maps in their operations rooms.” 
 
Deputy Prime Minister to Persatuan Ekonomi Malaysia, 24 March 19665 
                                            
5 Source: National Archives of Malaysia (n.d.) “Speech by the Deputy Prime Minister to Persatuan 
Ekonomi Malaysia on 24th March, 1966.” In Ucapan-Ucapan Tun Haji Abdul Razak Bin Hussein 1966 (pp. 
54-66). Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: National Archives of Malaysia. 
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Across the countries studied, the dynamic can be characterised as a cyclical process – 
a high-level political drive that sets the extension of sanitation coverage within 
broader development initiatives, such as providing public health and affordable 
housing. This is underpinned by a compelling political narrative around the goal of 
building cohesive societies, or a common national identity with norms and standards 
built on notions of shared and collective responsibilities. National leaders and senior 
officials were continuously championing the benefits delivered by increased sanitation 
coverage and progress-chasing the planning and policies down the implementation 
chain to deliver improved performance. In turn, the monitoring and identification of 
critical bottlenecks was fed back into a reform and improvement process to deliver 
stronger performance and permanent outcomes. Using and responding to outcome 
monitoring information may be the essential ingredient of a sector that continues to 
make solid and rapid progress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
